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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent Congressional proposals suggest budding bipartisan 
support for enacting a patent box.2 A patent box3 is a regulatory regime 
granting tax relief for commercial activity related to qualifying research 
and development (R&D), patents, or other intellectual property (IP).4 
Tax relief is often provided to firms5 through a deduction, a reduced 
rate, or an exemption of IP income.6 Congressmen Boustany’s (R-LA) 
and Neal’s (D-MA) patent box proposal allows corporations to deduct 
71% of qualified profits, producing an effective 10% tax rate.7 
Meanwhile, Senator Feinstein’s (D-CA) proposal seeks a 15% tax rate 
on income from patents developed and used for manufacture in the 
                                                
2 JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN10289, A U.S. PATENT BOX: ISSUES 
(2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IN10289.pdf (“Congressional proposals for the 
subsidy (known as a patent or innovation box) include a draft proposal by 
Representatives Boustany and Neal, the Innovation Promotion Act of 2015, proposed 
legislation by Senator Feinstein, and a bill introduced by Representative Schwartz in the 
113th Congress (H.R. 2605).”); Evan Migdail & Bruce Thompson, Patent box concept 
emerges on the tax reform agenda for U.S. Congress, JDSUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (May 5, 
2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/patent-box-concept-emerges-on-the-tax-
27232/  (“In recent weeks, a major concept has emerged in tax reform discussions: the 
establishment of a patent or innovation box.”). 
3 Depending on the types of intellectual property covered, it is also known as an 
innovation box. See Bernard Knight & Goud Maragani, It Is Time for the United States to 
Implement a Patent Box Tax Regime to Encourage Domestic Manufacturing, 19 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39, 52 (2013). Ireland implemented the first patent box in 1973, and the 
UK, France, and China, among others, have done so in recent years.  GRAVELLE, supra 
note 2; ROBERT D. ATKINSON & SCOTT ANDES, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION 
FOUND., PATENT BOXES: INNOVATION IN TAX POLICY AND TAX POLICY FOR 
INNOVATION 15 (2011), http://www.itif.org/files/2011-patent-box-final.pdf. 
4 Jim Shanahan, Is it time for your Country to consider the “patent box”?, PWC’S 
GLOBAL R&D TAX SYMPOSIUM ON DESIGNING A BLUEPRINT FOR REDUCING THE AFTER-
TAX COST OF GLOBAL R&D 4 (2011), 
http://download.pwc.com/ie/pubs/2011_is_it_time_for_your_country_to_
consider_the_patent_box.pdf; ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 3. 
5 Per Bylund, The Economic Theory of the Firm, MISES DAILY (Sep. 20, 2011), 
https://mises.org/library/economic-theory-firm.  
6 Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International 
Competition, and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
347, 363 (2013). 
7 JASON J. FICHTNER & ADAM N. MICHEL, MERCATUS CENTER AT GEORGE MASON 
UNIV., DON’T PUT AMERICAN INNOVATION IN A PATENT BOX: TAX POLICY, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE FUTURE OF R&D, MERCATUS ON POLICY 2–3 
(2015), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Fichtner-Patent-Boxes-MOP.pdf; 
GRAVELLE, supra note 2.   
2
Cybaris®, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol7/iss2/2
251 PATENT BOX PROPOSALS  [7:249 2016] 
 
US.8 Although regimes vary,9 nations typically deploy patent boxes to 
address certain market failures hindering innovation.10 In particular, 
patent boxes have been adopted abroad as a back-end incentive to 
foster R&D commercialization and spending by domestic firms.11  
Despite widespread adoption, patent boxes remain 
controversial.12 Proponents cite potential domestic manufacturing gains 
and incentive effects.13 Skeptics and opponents, on the other hand, raise 
redundancy and efficacy concerns.14 Before expending political capital 
to adopt a patent box, its impact as a potential U.S. policy instrument 
should be considered.  
Assessing the efficacy of a patent box elsewhere may inform 
the U.S. impact analysis. The U.K. recently enacted a patent box in 
2013 and shares enough economic similarities to provide a useful 
comparison to the U.S.15 A mere country-to-country comparison, 
however, fails to consider the broader, interactive factors that 
contribute to a country’s innovation performance.16 A policy mix 
approach offers a conceptual framework for understanding the 
                                                
8 GRAVELLE, supra note 2.   
9 See Shanahan, supra note 4, at 4. See also Knight & Maragani, supra note 3, at 48. 
10 Innovation refers to the “transformation of ideas into new products, services, or 
improvements in organization or process.” RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: U.S. 
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 24 (Charles W. Wessner & Alan Wm. 
Wolff, eds., Nat’l Academies Press 2012), http://politiques-innovation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/2012-Wessner-STEP-Rising-to-the-Challenge-U.S.-Innovation-
Policy-for-Global-Economy.pdf. Accordingly, “[s]ome innovations are incremental; 
others are disruptive, displacing exiting technologies while creating new markets and 
value networks.” Id. ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 3, at 15–16; see infra Section III. 
11 ROBERT D. ATKINSON & STEPHEN J. EZELL, INNOVATION ECONOMICS: THE RACE FOR 
A GLOBAL ADVANTAGE 172 (2012); see GLOBAL TAX ACCOUNTING SERVICES, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PATENT BOX AND TECHNOLOGY INCENTIVES: TAX AND 
FINANCIAL REPORTING CONSIDERATIONS 1–2 (2014), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/
publications/assets/pwc-patent-box-and-technology-incentives-tax-and-financial-
reporting-considerations.pdf; see also Graetz & Doud, supra note 6, at 362 (“A 
substantial number of European countries have recently implemented innovation tax 
incentives that focus on the income, rather than the development, side of IP by adopting 
‘patent boxes,’ or ‘innovation boxes.’”). 
12 Simon Goodley, George Osborne waters down flagship controversial tax break, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2014, 1:07 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/nov/11/george-osborne-patent-boxes-tax-
break. 
13 See, e.g., Knight & Margani, supra note 3, at 42–46.  
14 ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 3, at 1, 9–14. 
15 ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 3, at 15. 
16 See infra Section III.  
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interdependence of actors, ideas, structures, institutions, and policies 
integral to a country’s innovation performance. Evaluating the impact 
of the U.K. patent box in this framework will overcome the pitfalls of a 
direct comparison.17 
Therefore, to gauge the value of adopting a patent box, this 
paper first establishes the importance of innovation policy within the 
increasingly competitive nature of the global economy.18 It then 
assesses the U.K. and U.S. policy instruments deployed to foster 
innovation: the patent box and the R&D tax credit, respectively.19 With 
an understanding of these two exemplary policy instruments, a broader 
policy mix framework is then developed to provide a conceptual 
underpinning for evaluating the efficacy of the patent box and the 
innovation ecology of both countries.20 This paper then, based on the 
comparison and policy mix framework, argues that the patent box 
provides little benefit beyond that of already implemented policy 
tools.21 Finally, a more comprehensive and directed approach to 
innovation, rather than the incremental one used thus far, is 
recommended to ensure that the U.S. remains competitive in the global 
economy.22 
 
II. U.K. AND U.S. INNOVATION POLICY IN A COMPETITIVE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 
A. Global Competition to Foster Innovation 
It is widely accepted by economists and nations alike that 
innovation drives economic prosperity.23 It is also well established that 
private sector R&D is “crucial to ongoing technological advances,” is 
                                                
17 See infra Section IV.  
18 See infra Section II.A.  
19 See infra Section II.B.  
20 See infra Section III. 
21 See infra Section IV.  
22 See infra Section IV.  
23 Graetz & Doud, supra note 6, at 348 (“Two things are clear and essentially uncontested 
among economists. First is the importance of technological innovations to economic 
growth.”); ATKINSON & EZELL supra note 11, at 6 (“[M]ost nations recognize that they 
have to be intense competitors if they are to be successful . . . . And most nations also 
realize that high wage innovation and knowledge-based industries play a key role in 
driving prosperity.”); RISING TO THE CHALLENGE, supra note 10, at 201 (“Virtually every 
important trading partner has declared innovation to be central to increasing productivity, 
economic growth, and living standards.”). 
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capable of producing positive externalities, and “is underproduced in 
the absence of government support.”24 This, combined with the 
growing mobility of firms, has created an environment where countries 
look to reel in firms with beneficial policies.25 Fierce competition has 
thus arisen between nations to develop innovation policies that attract 
firms willing to invest in R&D and increase commercialization by 
domestic firms:26 “Nations around the world are establishing national 
innovation strategies, restructuring their tax and regulatory systems to 
become more competitive, expanding support for science and 
technology, improving their education systems, spurring investment in 
broadband and other IT areas, and taking a myriad of other pro-
innovation steps.”27  
A nation hoping to compete in this environment must make 
innovation a focal point of its economic development.28 Failure to 
acknowledge and adapt to the increasingly competitive international 
innovation arena could spell future economic trouble.29 
The U.S. once stood at the forefront of innovation policy in 
the 1970s but has since fallen.30 Although it now spends more on R&D 
than any other nation, “its relative position (measured by the share of 
such investment in national income) has been falling even as other 
countries increase their investments in research.”31 This decline will 
become increasingly problematic as the U.S. economy relies more and 
                                                
24 Graetz & Doud, supra note 6, at 349; see Laura Tyson & Greg Linden, The Corporate 
R&D Tax Credit and U.S. Innovation and Competitiveness: Gauging the Economic and 
Fiscal Effectiveness of the Credit, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1 (2012), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2012/01/pdf/corporate_r_and_d.pdf  
25 See ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 3, at 15. 
26 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE, supra note 10, at 201 (“The twenty-first century is 
witnessing a rapidly evolving, intensely competitive global landscape. Political and 
business leaders in both advanced and emerging economies see innovation-led 
development as central to growth. China, India, Russia, Germany, and Singapore are 
among the many nations that are formulating comprehensive national strategies for 
improving their innovation capacity.”); see ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 3, at 20 n.1 
(quoting Rachel Griffith, Helen Miller & Martin O’Connell, “Corporate Taxes and the 
Location of Intellectual Property” (June 2011) (working paper) (Center for Economic 
Policy Research).  
27 3ATKINSON & EZELL, supra note 11, at 6.  
28 Id. at 8. 
29 Cf. id., at 9–10 (arguing that rapid industrial decline is related to a lack of challenging 
the status quo thinking regarding innovation–supporting policies). 
30 See id., at 6. 
31 TYSON & LINDEN, supra note 24, at 1.  
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more on innovation and IP.32 To stem this decline, the U.S. must 
reassess its innovation policy.33 
 
B. Comparing U.K. and U.S. Innovation Policy 
U.K. innovation policy and its effects serve as a useful 
counterpoint to those of the U.S., providing the comparative utility of a 
patent box and illustrative economic factors. Both, for example, are 
world-leaders in research34 and have top-notch universities, each an 
important element in sustaining innovation. A key distinction, however, 
lies in the U.K.’s comparatively low rate of business innovation.35 
From 2000 to 2013, the U.K.’s business R&D intensity36 ranked well 
below the average of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries.37 The U.S., on the other hand, ranked 
above the OECD average during the period from 2000 to 2012.38 These 
distinctions will prove useful in assessing the potential efficacy of the 




                                                
32 See ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 3, at 17. 
33 See id. 
34 See OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard (2011), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/sites/sti_scoreboard-2011-
en/02/05/index.html?itemId=/content/chapter/sti_scoreboard-2011-16-en (last visited 
May 14, 2016); Peter Coy, The Bloomberg Innovation Index, BLOOMBERG (2015), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-innovative-countries/. 
35 See THE ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., DIRECTORATE FOR SCI., TECH. 
AND INNOVATION, R&D TAX INCENTIVE SUPPORT: UNITED KINGDOM (2016), 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/OECD-STI-RDTaxIncentives-CountryProfile_GBR.pdf; THE 
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., DIRECTORATE FOR SCI., TECH. AND 
INNOVATION, R&D TAX INCENTIVE SUPPORT: UNITED STATES (2016), 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/OECD-STI-RDTaxIncentives-CountryProfile_USA.pdf. 
36 R&D intensity is a measure of an “economy’s relative degree of investment in 
generating new knowledge” and is calculated as the gross domestic expenditure on R&D 
as a percentage of GDP. OECD, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 
(2011), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/sti_scoreboard-2011-
en/02/05/index.html?itemId=/content/chapter/sti_scoreboard-2011-16-en (last visited 
May 14, 2016).  
37 Id. 
38 OECD, R&D TAX INCENTIVE SUPPORT: UNITED STATES, 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/OECD-STI-RDTaxIncentives-CountryProfile_USA.pdf (last 
visited May 14, 2016). 
39 See infra Section IV.  
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1. Innovation Policy in the UK 
“The U.K. has made a conscientious decision to place 
innovation at the center of our nation’s economic growth strategy”40 by 
deploying, among other things, R&D tax incentives and tax advantaged 
venture capital schemes as innovation policy instruments.41 Most 
relevant here, however, is its recent adoption of the patent box.   
 
a. History of the U.K. Patent Box 
Responding to a growing number of companies moving patent 
holdings offshore, the government in 2010 announced its intent to 
introduce a patent box as part of a larger plan to develop a more 
competitive tax system for businesses.42 In particular, the goal was to 
provide incentives for companies to retain and commercialize existing 
patents and to develop new patented products:43 “The Patent Box will 
encourage companies to locate the high-value jobs and activity 
associated with the development, manufacture and exploitation of 
patents in the UK. It will also enhance the competitiveness of the UK 
tax system for high-tech companies that obtain profits from patents.”44  
The patent box was developed, in part, over the course of three 
consultations.45 With each consultation, Her Majesty’s Treasury (HM 
Treasury), the economic and finance ministry of the U.K. 
                                                
40 ATKINSON & EZELL, supra note 11, at 135. 
41 DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, OUR PLAN FOR GROWTH: SCIENCE 
AND INNOVATION (2014), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/387780/P
U1719_HMT_Science_.pdf. 
42 HM TREASURY, CONSULTATION ON THE PATENT BOX 3 (2011), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/81512/con
sult_patent_box.pdf. 
43 CIRD200110 Patent Box: overview of the patent box regime: aim of the patent box, 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/Manuals/cirdmanual/CIRD200110.htm (last visited May 14, 
2016). 
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government,46 hoped to engage “businesses, representative bodies and 
others interested in the [sic] promoting the growth of innovative 
companies in the U.K. will play a full part in the consultation 
process.”47 Shortly after these consultations, the Finance Act of 2012 
enacted the current patent box into law.48 
Recent developments, however, promise forthcoming changes 
to the patent box.49 On October 22, 2015, HM Treasury released a 
consultation discussing options for modifying the patent box in view of 
OECD recommendations predicated on curbing base erosion and profit 
shifting by multinational enterprises.50 The U.K.’s new approach to the 
patent box will be that of a modified nexus approach.51 Future 
legislation will likely “introduce a requirement that, in order to benefit 
from the regime, a business must conduct the substantial activities 
which generate the income benefiting from the regime.”52 The changes 
aligned with the OECD recommendations will apply to new entrants on 
July 1, 2016.53 
 
b. Design of the U.K. Patent Box 
The current U.K. patent box, as yet unchanged by the OECD 
recommendations, applies a 10% lower rate of corporate tax to profits 
attributable to patents and equivalent forms of IP, whether received as a 
                                                
46 HM Treasury, About us, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-
treasury/about (last visited May 14, 2016) (“HM Treasury is the government’s economic 
and finance ministry, maintaining control over public spending, setting the direction of 
the U.K.’s economic policy and working to achieve strong and sustainable economic 
growth.”). 
47 CONSULTATION ON THE PATENT BOX, supra note 42. 
48 CIRD200120 Patent Box: overview of the patent box regime: history of the patent box, 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/Manuals/cirdmanual/CIRD200120.htm (last visited May 14, 
2016); see Finance Act 2012, sch. 2, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/14/pdfs/ukpga_20120014_en.pdf (last visited 
May 14, 2016); see also PATENT BOX: SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVITIES, supra note 45, at 7. 
49 See PATENT BOX: SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVITIES, supra note 45, at 10. 
50 See id. at 1; Simmons & Simmons, U.K. consultation on patent box changes, ELIXICA 
(Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.elexica.com/en/legal-topics/tax/30-uk-consultation-on-
patent-box-changes.  
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royalty or embedded in the sales price of a product.54 The lower rate is 
achieved through an equivalent deduction based on relevant profits.55 
The deduction can be calculated according to the following formula:  
 
RP × FY% × ((MR - IPR) ÷ MR) 
 
where RP is the profits of a company’s trade relevant to patent box; 
FY% is the appropriate percentage for each financial year; MR is the 
main rate of Corporation Tax; and IPR is the reduced rate of 10%.56 
Qualifying companies can elect to receive this benefit.57  
 In order to qualify, a company must satisfy one of three 
conditions: condition A, B, or C.58 A company fulfills condition A if it 
holds qualifying IP rights or an exclusive license in qualifying IP 
rights.59 Condition B is met if a company has held a ‘qualifying IP 
right’ or an exclusive license in respect of any qualifying IP rights, has 
received income in respect of an event or events occurring at times 
when it was a qualifying company and a patent box election had effect, 
and that income falls to be taxed in a later accounting period.60 Lastly, 
condition C can be met only by members of a group and requires a 
company to have either developed or be actively managing its IP 
portfolio.61 Qualifying IP includes patents granted under the U.K. 
Patents Act of 1977 and under the European Patent Convention.62 
                                                
54 HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, CORPORATION TAX: THE PATENT BOX (Jan. 1, 2007) 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/corporation-tax-the-patent-box; see also PATENT BOX: 
SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVITIES, supra note 45, at 7.; CIRD200120, supra note 48. 
55 PATENT BOX: SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVITIES, supra note 45, at 7. 
56 CORPORATION TAX: THE PATENT BOX, supra note 54. 
57 DLA Piper, The UK Patent Box: Plan Now For 2013 and Beyond 1 (2012), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/Files/Insights/Publications/2012/07/The%20UK%20p
atent%20box/Files/UK_Patent_Box/FileAttachment/UK_Patent_Box.pdf (last visited 
May 14, 2016). 
58 CIRD210100 Patent Box: qualifying companies: meaning of ‘qualifying company,’ 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/cirdmanual/CIRD210100.htm (last visited May 14, 
2016). 
59 Id.  
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 DLA Piper, supra note 57, at 2. 
9
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c. Efficacy of the U.K. Patent Box 
It may be too early to assess the true impact of the U.K. patent 
box.63 One way to determine the effectiveness of the patent box would 
require data showing the extent to which it accomplished its aims.64 A 
proper evaluation would thus require evidence showing the extent to 
which the tax regime incentivized companies to retain and 
commercialize existing patents or develop newly patented products at 
the margins.65 It would also consider evidence tending to show the 
movement of high-value jobs into the U.K. to exploit the tax regime.66 
This, weighed against the loss of tax revenue resulting from these tax 
breaks would provide an idea of the measure’s efficacy.67  
Some emerging evidence may bear on this balance, but the 
overall outlook remains unclear. According to HM Treasury, “[t]he 
introduction of the Patent Box has encouraged investment and 
economic growth in the U.K. as well as limiting the movement of 
intellectual property offshore by innovative businesses that might 
otherwise have invested elsewhere.”68 As of October 22, 2015, 639 
companies using the patent box had received a benefit having an 
aggregate total of £335 million.69 Further dissection of this statistic, 
however, would be necessary to understand how it captures the 
commercialization of patents for companies that would not have 
otherwise done so. Additionally, GlaxoSmithKline, a pharmaceutical 
                                                
63 See CAMBRIDGE DESIGN PARTNERSHIP AND MARKS & CLERK, An Industry Report on 
the Patent Box Initiative and its Impact on UK Innovation, Patent Box: Incentivizing UK 
Innovation 6 (2013), http://www.marks-
clerk.com/MarksClerk/media/MCMediaLib/PDF's/Reports/Marks-Clerk-Patent-Box-
Report-2013.pdf?ext=.pdf (last visited May 14, 2016). 
64 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Reducing the 
Risk of Policy Failure: Challenges for Regulatory Compliance 7 (2000), 
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/1910833.pdf (“A key determinant of 
government effectiveness is how well regulatory systems achieve their policy 
objectives.”). See also supra Section II.B.a. 
65 See CHARLES LEVY & LAURA O’BRIEN, Will the Patent Box Boost the U.K. Innovation 
Ecosystem?, BIG INNOVATION CENTRE 7 (2013) 
https://fvstatic.s3.amazonaws.com/1425647105_0329808001425647105.pdf. 
66 See supra Section II.B.2.a. 
67 A similar balancing analysis would be needed to test the impact of the R&D tax credit. 
See, e.g,. GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31191, RESEARCH TAX 
CREDIT: CURRENT LAW AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 114TH CONGRESS 8 (2015), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31181.pdf; see also supra Section II.B.2.c. 
68 PATENT BOX: SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVITIES, supra note 45, at 24. 
69 Id. at 5. 
10
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company ranked the 135th largest in the world as of 2015,70 stated an 
intention to relocate R&D operations into the U.K. to take advantage of 
the patent box.71 Though promising, it is unclear the extent to which 
this may be indicative of other companies following suit. Lastly, 
another potential efficacy metric, arguably in alignment with stated 
objectives,72 might be the extent to which patent filings have increased 
after or in anticipation of the tax regime’s implementation.73 Patent 
application filings in the U.K. totaled 22,256 in 2011; 23,229 in 2012; 
22,936 in 2013; and 23,040 in 2014.74 Patent publications totaled 
10,043 in 2011; 10,653 in 2012; 11,021 in 2013; and 12,227 in 2014.75 
Based on the data thus far, there is no clear indication that the patent 
box has affected filings. In light of all presented data, further evidence 
is needed to assess the efficacy of the U.K. patent box.  
 
2. Innovation Policy in the US 
In contrast to the U.K. patent box, U.S. federal law provides 
two tax incentives for firm R&D investment, both of which were 
enacted to overcome market failures.76 Section 174 of the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC) offers an unlimited expensing allowance for 
qualified research spending, while Section 41 of the IRC offers a non-
                                                
70 The World’s Biggest Public Companies, FORBES.COM, 
http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/3/#tab:overall (last visited May 14, 2016). 
71 Bob Stembridge, Patent Box Tax Incentives Show Positive Signs, THOMPSON REUTERS, 
http://stateofinnovation.thomsonreuters.com/patent-box-tax-incentives-show-positive-
signs (last visited May 14, 2016) (“GlaxoSmithKline is on record as taking advantage of 
the U.K. Patent Box by relocating some of its R&D operations back to the U.K. from 
offshore locations. Chief Executive Andrew Witty said recently, ‘Since the Patent Box, 
we’ve invested in upgrading 15 or 16 of our sites in the UK. It has made Britain the go-to 
place for our industry.’”). 
72 See supra Section II.B.1.  
73 See CAMBRIDGE DESIGN PARTNERSHIP AND MARKS & CLERK, supra note 63, at 3 
(comparing patent application numbers between countries that have enacted Patent Box 
schemes to those that have not).  
74 INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, Facts and figures: Patent, trade mark, design & hearing 
administrative data 2013 and 2014 calendar years 5 (June 2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/456097/Fa
cts_and_Figures_2015.pdf. 
75 Id.  
76 See Gary Guenther, Research Tax Credit: Current Law and Policy Issues for the 114th 
Congress, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL31191 at 2 (March 13, 2015), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31181.pdf; W. Wesley Hill & J. Sims Rhyne, 
Opening Pandora’s Patent Box: Global Intellectual Property Tax Incentives and Their 
Implication for the United States, 53 IDEA 371, 377 (2013).  
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refundable tax credit for qualified research spending above a base 
amount (“the R&D credit”).77 The former, enacted in 1954,78 allows a 
taxpayer “to deduct currently all ‘research and experimental 
expenditures’ made in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business 
or to amortize the expenditures over a period of not less than 60 
months.”79 The latter, and the focus of this section, provides an income 
tax credit for qualified R&D expenditures.80  
 
a. History of the U.S. R&D Tax Credit 
Responding to the decline in research and development 
expenditures relative to the real gross national product from 1968 to 
1979,81 Congress established a temporary research tax credit in Section 
41 of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (“ERTA”).82 Section 41 
of the ERTA provided a tax credit to firms “equal to 25% of qualified 
research spending above a base amount, which was equal to average 
spending on such research in the three previous tax years, or 50% of 
current-year spending, whichever was greater.”83 Since its inception, 
the R&D credit has been modified and extended numerous times.84 In 
                                                
77 Guenther, supra note 76, at 2; see 26 U.S.C. § 174 (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 41 (2012). 
78 Guenther, supra note 76, at 2. 
79 David L. Cameron, Research Tax Credit: Statutory Construction, Regulatory 
Interpretation and Policy Incoherence, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 63, 72 (2004); Hill & 
Rhyne, supra note 76, at 376. 
80 Graetz & Doud, supra note 6, at 353. 
81 Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 97th Cong., General Explanation of the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, at 119 (Comm. Print 1981) (“In the case of research and 
development activities conducted by business, company-financed and Federal 
expenditures over the 12-year period 1968-1979 remained at a fairly stable level in real 
terms, fluctuating between $19 and $22.8 billion in constant dollars. Relative to real gross 
national product, such expenditures for company research declined from 2.01 percent in 
1968 to 1.58 percent in 1975, essentially remaining at that level since then.”). 
82 Id. at 120 (“In order to reverse this decline in research spending by industry, the 
Congress concluded that a substantial tax credit for incremental research and 
experimental expenditures was needed to overcome the reluctance of many ongoing 
companies to bear the significant costs of staffing and supplies, and certain equipment 
expenses such as computer charges, which must be incurred to initiate or expand research 
programs in a trade or business.”). See Hill & Rhyne, supra note 76, at 377; Graetz & 
Doud, supra note 6, at 352. 
83 Guenther, supra note 76, at 11. 
84 Tyson & Linden, supra note 24, at 7 (“Since then [1981], the credit has been 
restructured several times and renewed 13 times. With a single 12-month exception in 
1995–1996 (during which the credit ceased to be in effect), each extension has continued 
from the previous date of expiration.”); Guenther, supra note 76, at 11. 
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the first such alteration, Congress revised the research tax credit in the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 and extended the credit until December 31, 
1988.85 Other noteworthy modifications occurred in the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 and the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 raised the base 
amount so that it was equal to the greater of 50% of a firm’s current-
year qualified research expenditures, or the product of the firm’s 
average annual gross receipts in the previous four tax years and a 
“fixed-base percentage.”86 The Energy Policy Act “added a fourth 
component to the research tax credit by establishing a credit equal to 
20% of payments for energy research performed under contract by 
qualified research consortia, colleges and universities, federal 
laboratories, and eligible small firms.”87 Now, with the passage of the 
Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, the R&D tax credit 
been extended indefinitely.88 
 
b. Design of the U.S. R&D Tax Credit 
In an effort spanning decades, the U.S. has developed a 
quadripartite R&D credit, comprising: (1) a regular research credit, (2) 
an alternative simplified credit, (3) a basic research credit, and (4) an 
energy research credit.89 The regular research credit equals the sum of 
20% of a company’s qualified research expenditures for the taxable 
year over the base amount.90 With the alternative simplified credit, a 
firm may elect to receive a credit equal to 14% of the qualified research 
expenses “for the taxable year as exceeds 50 percent of the average 
qualified research expenses for the 3 taxable years preceding the 
taxable year for which the credit is being determined.”91 The basic 
research credit, under IRC Section 41(e), allows companies that partner 
with non-profit organizations to receive a credit equal to 20% for 
qualified research above the qualified organizational base period 
                                                
85 Guenther, supra note 76, at 11. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 13. 
88 See Kevin Brady, Section-by-Section Summary of the Proposed “Protecting Americans 
from Tax Hikes Act of 2015,” COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 3 (2015), 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/SECTION-BY-SECTION-
SUMMARY-OF-THE-PROPOSED-PATH-ACT.pdf. 
89 Guenther, supra note 76, at 3.  
90 26 U.S.C. § 41(a)(1) (2012); Guenther, supra note 76, at 13. 
91 26 U.S.C. § 41(c)(5). 
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amount.92 Lastly, the energy research credit provides firms with a tax 
credit that equals “20 percent of the amounts paid or incurred by the 
taxpayer in carrying on any trade or business of the taxpayer during the 
taxable year (including as contributions) to an energy research 
consortium for energy research.”93 
The regular research credit and the alternative simplified 
credit rely on calculations using qualified research expenses and a base 
amount.94 Qualified research expenses refer to the sum of in-house 
research expenses or contract research expenses that are paid or 
incurred by a firm during the taxable year.95 In-house expenses include 
wages and supply costs.96 Contract research expenses refer to 65% of 
the amount paid to another for qualified research.97 The base amount is 
calculated from the product of the fixed-base percentage and the 
average gross receipts of the taxpayer for the four taxable years prior to 
the credit year.98 
 
c. Efficacy of the U.S. R&D Tax Credit 
Much like the U.K. patent box,99 the effectiveness of the U.S. 
R&D credit remains unclear.100 “In theory, the credit stimulates 
increased investment in qualified research by lowering the after-tax 
cost of undertaking another dollar of research.”101 Economic studies 
have attempted to measure the efficacy of the R&D tax credit using 
cost-benefit or R&D price elasticity analyses.102 This cost-benefit 
method compares the increase in R&D spending to the loss in tax 
revenue, while the price elasticity method “measures the percent 
change in R&D in response to a 1% change in the user cost of 
R&D.”103 A review of such studies found that there was a “dollar-for-
dollar increase in reported R&D spending on the margin” as a result of 
                                                
92 Guenther, supra note 76, at 8. 
93 26 U.S.C. § 41(a)(3) (2012). 
94 Id. at § 41. 
95 Id. at § 41(b). 
96 Id. at § 41(b)(3). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at § 41(c). 
99 See supra Part II.B.1.iii. 
100 Graetz & Doud, supra note 6, at 355. 
101 Guenther, supra note 76, at 8. 
102 Graetz & Doud, supra note 6, at 355. 
103 Id. at 356. 
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the R&D tax credit from 1980 to 1991.104 A study specific to the 
pharmaceutical industry from 1982 to 1985, however, found the credit 
to be much less beneficial, calling into question the reliability of such 
analyses.105 Even in more recent studies, the efficacy of the R&D tax 
credit remains debated.106 
 
III. AN INNOVATION POLICY MIX 
Policy makers and scholars increasingly tout the use of a 
policy mix to address the intricacies affecting a nation’s ability to 
stimulate innovation.107 Although the scope of the term itself is subject 
to debate,108 a policy mix109 can be understood as the combination of 
and interaction between the domain areas covered, the rationales 
proposed, the strategic tasks pursued, and the policy instruments 
deployed to address a country’s innovation goals.110 The policy mix 
approach accounts for the interdependence of actors, ideas, structures, 
institutions, and policies that contribute to a nation’s innovation 
performance and provides a tool for assessing the effectiveness of the 
entirety of a nation’s innovation policies and the interactions thereof.111 
“Using the policy mix concept . . . helps draw attention to 
inconsistencies and redundancies” that may arise from the incremental 
deployment of policy instruments.112 If it does not consider the entire 
                                                
104 See BRONWYN H. HALL, EFFECTIVENESS OF RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION TAX 
CREDITS: CRTITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH DESIGN (1995), 
https://eml.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/BHH95%20OTArtax.pdf. 
105 Graetz & Doud, supra note 6, at 356. 
106 See Guenther, supra note 76, at 8. 
107 Kieron Flanagan, Elvira Uyarra, & Manuel Laranja, Reconceptualising the ‘policy 
mix’ for Innovation, RESEARCH POLICY, Vol. 40 702–13 (2011); OECD, OECD Science, 
Technology and Industry Outlook, OECD PUBLISHING 254 (2010), 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/science-and-technology/oecd-
science-technology-and-industry-outlook-2010_sti_outlook-2010-en#page265. 
108 Flanagan, Uyarra, & Laranja, supra note 107, at 4–5; OECD, supra note 107, at 254. 
109 The policy mix concept originated in the 1960s in the context of monetary and fiscal 
policy and has since migrated to other policy arenas, including innovation. Flanagan, 
Uyarra, & Laranja, supra note 107, at 3. 
110 OECD, supra note 107, at 257. This understanding can be debated; however, in this 
paper, this use is preferred.  
111Id. at 255–56; see also Innovation policy mix for business R&D and Innovation, 
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/sti/outlook/e-
outlook/stipolicyprofiles/competencestoinnovate/innovationpolicymixforbusinessrdandin
novation.htm (last visited May 14, 2016). 
112 Innovation policy mix for business R&D and Innovation, supra note 111. 
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innovation ecology assessed by the policy mix, a nation, though 
interested in stimulating domestic innovation, might implement policy 
instruments that focus too heavily on too small of an area, minimizing 
its potential returns.113 Developing this framework will inform the 
patent box efficacy analysis.  
 
A. Domain Areas 
All of innovation policies can be bifurcated into domain areas: 
framework condition policies and dedicated science, technology, and 
innovation policies.114 The complementary nature, or lack thereof, of 
these domain areas may augment or reduce intended policy effects.115 
Accordingly, a considered approach addressing the interaction of these 
policies can “promote positive feedback responses in the tightly-
coupled parts of the economy, or at least . . . mitigate the force of 
negative feedbacks that can damp, or effectively counteract, the 
intended effects of the policy intervention targets.”116 
Framework condition policies affect the broad economic 
factors relating to innovation and may not relate solely to innovation 
goals.117 Exemplary economic factors include, among others, 
macroeconomic policy, tax policy, labor market policy, competition 
policy, education and training, infrastructure, and intellectual property 
rights.118 Although these policies may not be innovation-specific, they 
can be foundational.119 For example, a strong education system will 
                                                
113 See id. 
114 See OECD, supra note 107, at, 259.  
115 See id. at 260–61. 
116 PHILIPPE AGHION, PAUL A. DAVID & DOMINQUE FORAY, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND 
INNOVATION FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH: TOWARDS LINKING POLICY RESEARCH AND 
PRACTICE IN ‘STIG SYSTEMS’ 22 (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy Research Discussion 
Paper No. 06-39, Oct. 2008), http://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/06-
39_0.pdf. 
117 OECD, supra note 107, at 260. 
118 OECD, supra note 107, at 260–62; OECD, INTELLIGENT DEMAND: POLICY 
RATIONALE, DESIGN AND POTENTIAL BENEFITS 54–57 (OECD Sci, Tech and Industry 




119 See OECD, OECD REVIEWS OF INNOVATION POLICY: CHINA 395 (2008), 
http://climatesolver.org/sites/default/files/pdf/0809.pdf (“It is widely acknowledged that 
innovative capacity is determined not only by a country’s research and development 
(R&D) system but also by the interplay of factors which enable knowledge to be 
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provide the highly-skilled workforce necessary to drive innovation.120 
In another example, a stable macroeconomic environment may relieve 
some of a firm’s more immediate concerns and allow it to invest in 
long-term R&D projects.121 “There is a strong link between innovation 
performance and innovation framework conditions.”122 “Supportive 
framework conditions enable and facilitate innovation throughout the 
economy” and have recently become more of a focal point for fostering 
innovation.123 
Dedicated science, technology, and innovation policies, by 
contrast, target specific market, system, or even framework condition 
policy failures relating to innovation.124 These policies incorporate both 
supply- and demand-side measures—for example, R&D tax incentives 
schemes or grants, and procurement policies, respectively—to support 
direct investment in science, technology, and innovation, to enhance 
the innovation competencies of firms, or to strengthen linkages within 
innovation systems.125 Both the U.K. patent box and U.S. R&D tax 
credit are examples of dedicated science, technology, and innovation 
polices, as each focused on correcting specific market failures.126 
 
B. Rationales 
The fundamental rationales justifying policy intervention 





                                                                                              
converted into new products, processes and organisational forms which in turn enhance 
economic development and growth.”). 
120 OECD, supra note 107, at 261. 
121 Id. 
122 INSIDE CONSULTING, BENCHMARKING INNOVATION POLICY AND INNOVATION 
FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS 2 (Jan. 2004), 
http://www.oecd.org/site/worldforum/33705586.pdf. 
123 OECD, supra note 107, at 260. 
124 Id. at 260, 262.  
125 Id. at 260, 268. 
126 See supra Section II.  
127 JAKOB EDLER, HUGH CAMERON & MOHAMMAD HAJHASHEM, WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION [WIPO], THE INTERSECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND INNOVATION POLICY MAKING – A LITERATURE REVIEW 7 (Jul. 2015), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_report_ip_inn.pdf.  
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1. Market Failure 
Market failure describes both the inability of price-market 
institutions to facilitate desirable activities or to halt undesirable ones 
and the inefficient allocation of resources.128 These failures stem from 
indivisibilities, uncertainties, and externalities in the market 
economy.129 Innovation market failures, in particular, primarily 
manifest in three ways: 
i) R&D activity often incurs high fixed costs and 
economies of scale, while learning-by-doing gives 
rise to dynamic economies of scale; ii) investment in 
R&D is inherently risky and information 
asymmetries abound in markets for knowledge and 
technology, where they exist; and iii) because 
knowledge has properties of a public good as 
performers of R&D can only imperfectly appropriate 
the results of their effort and the use of knowledge 
does not preclude its simultaneous use by others.130 
Underinvestment in R&D in the face of market failure has long been 
the principle reason for policy intervention.131 These failures, it is 
argued, prevent investment in innovation at the socially optimal 
level.132 The U.K. patent box and U.S. R&D credit were predicated on 
addressing market failures.133 
 
                                                
128 Frances M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 3 (1958), 
http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~sok/papers/b/Bator-market-failure.pdf; CLIFFORD 
WINSTON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET FAILURE: MICROECONOMICS 
POLICY RESEARCH AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 2 (2006), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2006/9/monetarypolicy-
winston/20061003.pdf; see also ELLEN SEWELL, MARKET FAILURE 26, 
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/curriculum/socialstudies/rigorous-
ap/economics/microeconomics.pdf (Apr. 10, 2016). 
129 Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in 
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 
609, 609 (1962), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2144.pdf; INTELLIGENT DEMAND, supra 
note 118, at 8. 
130 INTELLIGENT DEMAND, supra note 118, at 8 (emphasis in original). 
131 Id.; OECD, supra note 107, at 262. 
132 INTELLIGENT DEMAND, supra note 118, at 8. 
133 See supra Section II.  
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2. System Failure 
System failures describe the barriers to innovation that arise 
from inertia in the economy and hinder the production, distribution, and 
adoption of knowledge.134 Innovation often requires cooperation or the 
exchange of ideas to generate knowledge.135 System failures are 
framework conditions—such as network effects, slow technological 
transitions, slow-changing norms and values, and lack of 
infrastructure136—that inhibit these necessary interactions.137 “System 
failures block the functioning of the innovation system, hinder the flow 
of knowledge and technology and, as a result, reduce the overall 
efficiency of the system-wide R&D and innovation effort.”138 
Overcoming these failures, however, necessitates building up 
capability, intermediation, training, and cooperative programs.139 
 
3. Societal Missions and Costs 
Societal missions and challenges direct the focus of 
technology development in order to satisfy certain societal needs: “[I]t 
is a primary duty of politics to provide direction for technological 
development and innovation in order to satisfy state needs (e.g. 
defence, security) and citizen needs (health, education).”140 These 
measures incentivize actors to invest or pool resources to achieve a 
predetermined goal.141  
 
C. Strategic Tasks 
Strategic tasks are the objectives addressed by policy 
instruments.142 Complementary strategic tasks provide an optimal 
                                                
134 OECD, supra note 107, at 263; INTELLIGENT DEMAND, supra note 118, at 9. 
135 EDLER, CAMERON & HAJHASHEM, supra note 127, at 7. 
136 INTELLIGENT DEMAND, supra note 118, at 9–10. 
137 EDLER, CAMERON & HAJHASHEM, supra note 127, at 7.  
138 OECD, supra note 107, at 263. 
139 EDLER, CAMERON & HAJHASHEM, supra note 127, at 7. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 OECD, supra note 107, at 264–65. 
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arrangement of policy instruments for supporting innovation.143 These 
objectives include educating a potential workforce, ensuring proper 
development and use of knowledge, providing supportive 
infrastructures, enhancing public research contributions, and unleashing 
the potential of firms.144 In the case of the U.K. patent box, one 
strategic task, among others, was to increase patent related 
commercialization.145 The U.S. R&D tax credit, by contrast, sought to 
incentivize firms to invest in R&D.146  
 
D. Instruments 
Policy instruments are the regulatory tools used to achieve 
particular strategic tasks and can be divided into five different 
binaries.147 
 
1. Population vs. Non-Population Specific  
This distinction characterizes who is the focus of the policy 
intervention.148 Population-targeted instruments focus on the type of 
firm or sector to be supported, whereas non-population targeted 
instruments will apply broadly.149 Population-targeted instruments may 
be directed toward facilitating innovation in small and medium-sized 
enterprises (“SMEs”).150 The U.K., for instance, has implemented 
several policy measures focused on SMEs.151 In non-population-
targeted instruments, policy intervention may affect firms of all types. 
                                                
143 See Zeting Liu, The Research Tax Credit in the Policy Mix for Innovation: The French 
Case, J. INNOVATION ECON. no. 12, at 199, ¶ 3 (2013), http://www.cairn.info/revue-
journal-of-innovation-economics-2013-2-page-199.htm. 
144 OECD, supra note 107, at 265. 
145 See supra Section II.B.1.  
146 See supra Section II.B.2.  
147 See OECD, supra note 107, at 267–70; Innovation policy mix for business R&D and 
Innovation, supra note 111. 
148 Innovation policy mix for business R&D and Innovation, supra note 111.  
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
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Both the U.K. patent box and the U.S. R&D tax credit exemplify non-
population-targeted instruments, as each applies broadly.152 
 
2. Technology vs. Non-Technology Targeted  
Technology-targeted policy instruments focus on developing 
specific technologies, whereas non-technology-targeted instruments 
apply broadly.153 For example, a nation may have an interest in 
developing its biotechnology sector and intervene accordingly.154 
Policy instruments may instead encourage all technologies. The U.K. 
patent box and U.S. R&D tax credit typify the latter, as neither focuses 
on incentivizing one particular technology.155 
 
3. Competitive vs. Non-competitive  
Competitive policy instruments confer a benefit once certain 
performance threshold criteria have been met.156 Non-competitive 
instruments, on the other hand, apply universally or after a selection 
process based on eligibility requirements.157 Recently, countries have 
moved toward more competitive instruments for public sector research 
institutions.158 The U.K. patent box and U.S. R&D tax, however, 
exemplify non-competitive policy instruments, as applicants can simply 
elect to apply these measures to eligible income or expenditures.159 
 
4. Financial vs. Non-financial  
Policy instruments can be financial or non-financial in 
nature.160 Financial instruments can be further divided into direct and 
indirect instruments.161 Direct financial instruments include loans, 
grants and innovation vouchers, while tax incentives are an example of 
                                                
152 See supra Section II.  
153 Innovation policy mix for business R&D and Innovation, supra note 111. 
154 See id. 
155 See supra Section II.  
156 See Innovation policy mix for business R&D and Innovation, supra note 111. 
157 See id.  
158 OECD, supra note 107, at 267.  
159 See supra Section II.B.  
160 OECD, supra note 151, at 153. 
161 Innovation policy mix for business R&D and Innovation, supra note 111. 
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an indirect financial instrument.162 Accordingly, the U.K. patent box 
and the U.S. R&D tax credit are both examples of indirect financial 
policy instruments.163 Non-financial instruments include information 
campaigns or providing services.164 More often than not, nations deploy 
financial instruments.165  
 
5. Supply-side vs. Demand-side  
Lastly, “[p]olicy instruments to accelerate innovation have 
been described as either technology (supply) push or demand (market) 
pull.”166 Supply-side instruments foster knowledge production in order 
to accelerate knowledge spillovers and externalities.167 Providing tax 
incentives to encourage R&D spending is one example of a supply-side 
measure.168 Both the U.K. patent box and U.S. R&D tax credit 
exemplify supply-side measures. In contrast, demand-side instruments 
foster market opportunities for innovation and encourage suppliers to 
meet consumer innovation needs.169 Public procurement is one example 
of demand-side measure.170 Although innovation policy has 
traditionally favored supply-side instruments, interest in demand-side 
instruments has grown in recent years.171  
 
IV. CONSTRUING THE PATENT BOX IN VIEW OF THE POLICY MIX 
A policy prescription based solely on a comparison of 
pertinent regulatory measures and the effects thereof would necessarily 
ignore numerous dissimilarities and empirical uncertainties.172 The 
U.K., or any country for that matter, has a unique set of actors, ideas, 
structures, institutions, and policies that shape its innovation 
performance.173 No single policy instrument is implemented in a 
                                                
162 Id. 
163 See supra Section II.B.  
164 Innovation policy mix for business R&D and Innovation, supra note 111. 
165 Id.  
166 INTELLIGENT DEMAND, supra note 118, at 3. 
167 Innovation policy mix for business R&D and Innovation, supra note 111. 
168 See supra Section II.B.  
169 Innovation policy mix for business R&D and Innovation, supra note 111. 
170 OECD, supra note 151, at 187–88. 
171 OECD, supra note 107, at 267–68; INTELLIGENT DEMAND, supra note 118, at 3; see 
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vacuum. Proclaiming the efficacy of a patent box based on the number 
of participating companies or the patents filed in the U.K. alone likely 
neglects other important factors at play. To the extent this can be 
overcome, a policy mix approach provides a means for normalization 
and contextualization in performing such a comparison.174 In other 
words, there is something to be gained from comparing the U.K.’s 
adoption of the patent box in the context of the policy mix and from the 
policy mix approach per se.  
 
A. Redundancy 
A patent box provides a similar yet less effective incentive 
scheme compared to the already deployed R&D tax credit. Applying 
the policy mix reveals that both the patent box and the R&D tax credit 
are substantially similar policy instruments.175 Both, as dedicated 
science, technology, and innovation policies,176 target specific market 
failures rather than framework conditions.177 In particular, the patent 
box pushes companies to commercialize patent-related products,178 
while the U.S. R&D tax credit incentivizes companies to invest in 
R&D.179 In terms of the binaries, each is broadly applicable and 
without significant thresholds, and thus non-population targeted, non-
technology specific, and non-competitive.180 Each provides firms with 
a tax credit, characteristic of an indirect financial instrument.181 Lastly, 
both measures seek to foster the production of innovation rather than 
the market demand for it, making them supply-side instruments.182 
Nevertheless, instruments sharing these attributes do not 
necessarily share effectiveness. An important distinction can be made 
regarding where a given policy instrument acts within the innovation 
development cycle.183 Here, the R&D tax credit applies when a firm 
incurs expenses (a front-end incentive),184 whereas the patent box 
                                                
174 See id. 
175 See supra Section III. 
176 See supra Section III.A.  
177 See supra Section III.A.  
178 See supra Section II.B.1.i.; CIRD200110, supra note 43.  
179 See supra Section II.B.2. 
180 See supra Section III.D 
181 See supra Section III.D.5. 
182 Id. 
183 Graetz & Doud, supra note 6, at 363. 
184 Hill & Rhyne, supra note 76, at 377. 
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applies upon earning qualified income (a back end incentive).185 
Regarding these particular instruments, it is likely more beneficial to 
subsidize front-end activity than it is to subsidize back-end activity.186 
“Rather than incentivizing private investment in technologies that are 
under-explored (those with large and hard-to-capture benefits), a patent 
box incentivizes firms to invest in new technologies that return the 
largest private profits with the fewest externalities.”187 Put differently, 
patent boxes may encourage profit at the expense of innovation. 
Additional difficulties in defining what income is sufficiently related to 
a patent in order to qualify may further tip the scales.188  
Patent box proponents argue that the policies in tandem might 
provide synergistic returns outweighing the social cost.189 Based on the 
understanding of the UK’s innovation landscape provided by the policy 
mix, however, nothing suggests that this would be the case.190 The U.K. 
has implemented both policies, and nothing yet suggests such a 
benefit.191 This may be made more compelling by the fact that there is a 
commercialization market failure in the U.K. that is not present, 
comparatively, in the US.192 If one was to expect a combined effect 
from adding a patent box, it seems like it might occur in the instance 
where the patent box, by its nature, addresses the specific market 
failure of that country. All told, using these supply-side measures in 
conjunction would be granting similar tax breaks to firms without a 
clear social benefit in doing so. 
                                                
185 Graetz & Doud, supra note 6, at 363. 
186 GRAVELLE, supra note 2 (“Economic theory also suggests that it may be more 
desirable to subsidize investment in R&E rather than reduce the tax rates on the returns: 
higher tax rates reduce variance (the variation in return that occurs depending on the 
success of the research) as well as return and may, in some circumstances, increase risk 
taking.”); FICHTNER & MICHEL, supra note 7, at 3 (“Contrary to sound economic policy, 
a patent box explicitly subsidizes corporate profits that are captured by the private 
firm.”). 
187 FICHTNER & MICHEL, supra note 7, at 3 
188 See id. 
189 ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 3, at 1. 
190 See supra Section II.B.1.iii. 
191 Id. 
192 See supra Section II.B. 
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B. Remedying Market and System Failures 
It is also uncertain to what extent the patent box resolves the 
failures it purportedly addresses.193 One reason the U.K. implemented 
the patent box was to provide incentives for companies to retain and 
commercialize existing patents and to develop new patented 
products.194 In this regard, “[t]he data paint[s] a somewhat unclear 
picture as to whether or not patent boxes are serving their intended 
purpose to ‘attract R&D and increase commercialization of innovation 
from domestic firms.’”195 Beyond mere anecdotes,196 the adoption of 
the U.K. patent box has done little so far to discharge this 
uncertainty.197 For at least this reason, it seems prudent to wait until 
more data provides clarity on how well it overcomes this market failure 
and whether it is worth implementation in the U.S.  
Another reason proffered for deploying the patent box was to 
prevent tax base shifting, a system failure, and instead incentivize firms 
to relocate manufacturing operations to the adopting country.198 A 
recent study, however, has confirmed that patent boxes generate 
“significant effect on patent location without a change in real research 
activity, aiming only at the tax benefits.”199 In other words, firms are 
moving holdings to patent box countries while maintaining operations 
elsewhere. The recent OECD recommendations suggest that this may 
be the case with the current U.K. patent box.200 It is possible that these 
recommendations will resolve certain issues, but only time will tell if 
these changes will result in the relocation of manufacturing. Again, it 
                                                
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 3, at 12.; see supra Section II.B. 
196 See supra Section II.B.  
197 Id.  
198 Alexandra Thornton, Patent Tax Dodge: Why the Patent Box Does Not Answer 
America’s Need for Tax Reform, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (June 1, 2015), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2015/06/01/114088/patent-tax-
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seems sensible to see how well the UK’s new patent box produces the 
intended results before acting.  
 
C. Recommendations 
Expending political capital to enact a patent box as a cure-all 
for the U.S.’s innovation and tax woes would likely miss the mark. 
Instead, the U.S., once a leader in innovation policy,201 might well 
benefit from the measured and holistic approach provided by the policy 
mix model. Rather than simply following suit as other countries enact 
patent boxes, the U.S. could deploy any number of coherent and 
synergistic policy instruments to better foster innovation. For example, 
the U.S. could address certain framework conditions or perhaps target 
instruments to aid the innovation of SMEs.202 Looking into demand-
side policies may also provide a worthy compliment to the R&D tax 
credit, as studies have shown a clear interaction between such 
policies.203 Technology-targeted policy instruments might also help by 
providing resources to underfunded technology spaces.204 
Additionally, an ever-present undercurrent to patent box 
discussions seems to be corporate tax regulation as a whole.205 Some 
even see these proposals as a platform to address corporate tax 
reform.206 While tax policy is one of the framework conditions 
affecting innovation,207 it may be better to address these issues head on 
rather than attempting to solve with the patent box. “[P]roviding tax 
benefits for patent box income, especially if broadly defined, will lose 
revenues and make lowering overall corporate tax rates more difficult 
to achieve in a revenue-neutral tax reform.”208 
Lastly, measuring the efficacy of policy instruments can be 
quite difficult.209 In engineering control theory, feedback loops are used 
                                                
201 See ATKINSON & EZELL, supra note 11, at 245. 
202 OECD, supra note151, at 441–46. 
203 INTELLIGENT DEMAND, supra note 118, at 35. 
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to monitor dynamic systems.210 These feedback loops provide data for 
further corrective or adaptive modification.211 This concept may have 
value in forming policy instruments. Perhaps part of the policy 
development process could focus on how an instrument’s effectiveness 
might be evaluated in the future and ways in which pertinent data could 
be collected. In that way, the true impact could be assessed for more 
informed policymaking.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Emerging Congressional support for a patent box has afforded 
an opportunity to assess its potential use as an innovation policy tool.212 
Evaluating the U.K.’s recent adoption of a patent box in light of 
existing U.S. policy and within a policy mix framework has revealed 
certain redundancy and efficacy concerns. Innovation in the U.S. might 
be better served by adopting a policy mix approach, addressing certain 
framework conditions critical to innovation, and implementing 
additional policy tools to complement its R&D tax credit. Doing so 
may ensure continued prosperity in an increasingly competitive and 
innovation focused global economy.  
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